| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
srcu: Add list_splice_init_srcu()
list_splice_init_rcu() makes a list look empty to new readers, waits for
the current ones with the given sync function, and only then links the
entries into the new list. The sync function takes no argument, so it
can wait for RCU readers but not for the readers of an srcu_struct.
Passing synchronize_rcu() for a list read under SRCU still builds, but
leaves SRCU readers on the entries while the last one's next pointer is
moved onto the new list head. nvme_remove_namespaces() does this today.
Add list_splice_init_srcu(), which waits for the readers of the given
srcu_struct instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme: wait for SRCU readers before splicing the namespace list
Readers walk ctrl->namespaces under ctrl->srcu, and some of them sleep
there, e.g. nvme_wait_freeze() waiting for I/O to drain.
nvme_remove_namespaces() moves the list onto its on-stack ns_list with
list_splice_init_rcu(), which only waits for RCU readers before
relinking the entries. A reader still on the last namespace then follows
its next pointer to ns_list instead of ctrl->namespaces and treats the
stack as a namespace. Deleting a controller while a Format NVM
passthrough waits for a delayed read on the last namespace gives:
BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in nvme_wait_freeze+0x102/0x120
Read of size 8 at addr ff110001d2f3fc38 by task nvme/4413
Call Trace:
nvme_wait_freeze
nvme_passthru_start
nvme_submit_user_cmd
nvme_user_cmd
nvme_dev_ioctl
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff8af04850
Use list_splice_init_srcu() instead, which waits for the SRCU readers.
This also takes the RCU grace period out of every controller deletion.
Deleting 64 tcp controllers with one namespace each, median of 3 runs on
each of two boots per kernel:
before after
nvme disconnect-all (ms) 3491 / 3509 2996 / 3165
nvme_remove_namespaces() avg (ms) 39.0 / 40.5 31.9 / 34.7 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sched/fair: Clear throttle state when leaving the fair class
Task-based CFS bandwidth throttling removes a task's fair sched_entity
while the scheduler core still considers the task queued. p->throttled
carries the fair-specific state across dequeue/enqueue operations.
DEQUEUE_CLASS removes the task from cfs_rq->throttled_limbo_list
but retains the bit. If the last finite CFS quota is disabled while
the task runs in another class, it is absent from the unthrottle walk and
the bit survives.
Returning to fair while cfs_bandwidth_used() is false then performs a real
fair enqueue with p->throttled still set.
After bandwidth is re-enabled, a class-change dequeue treats the
stale bit as limbo state and skips __dequeue_task(). p->se.on_rq therefore
remains set, and put_prev_task_fair() places the entity in the EEVDF tree
while the task moves to RT. On exit, the fair picker can select the
TASK_DEAD task. __schedule() then returns to do_task_dead(),
which hits BUG().
Keep p->throttled across migrations and group moves, but clear it on
DEQUEUE_CLASS because fair-specific state must not outlive fair-class
membership. A later return to fair uses the normal enqueue path. That path
still respects a throttled cfs_rq.
A KASAN, LOCKDEP and DEBUG_LIST v7.3 kernel reproduced the do_task_dead()
BUG in 3/3 root and 3/3 delegated uid-1000 runs with CapPrm=CapEff=0 and
RLIMIT_RTPRIO=1. The fix passed both matrices plus a 3/3 class-switch
control with bandwidth continuously enabled, without a scheduler warning,
KASAN report, lockdep splat or crash.
An AI coding assistant analyzed the state mismatch and drafted the initial
reproducer, fix candidate and this changelog. The source paths, trigger,
controls and results were rechecked against the cited revisions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: kexec_file: Fix elf_headers memory leak in retry loop
A retry allocates new elf headers and overwrites image->elf_headers,
leaking the previous buffer.
Free it before assigning.
[catalin.marinas@arm.com: drop the redundant NULL check before vfree()] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: sdei: Preserve the interrupted context's exception registers
An SDEI event is dispatched by firmware regardless of PSTATE.DAIF, so it
can interrupt the kernel where the exception registers are live:
- exception entry, before kernel_entry has saved ELR_EL1/SPSR_EL1 and
before the C handler has read ESR_EL1/FAR_EL1;
- exception return, after kernel_exit has loaded ELR_EL1/SPSR_EL1 and
before the ERET.
An IRQ or pseudo-NMI cannot arrive there with PSTATE.I set. Firmware
saves only x0-x17, PC and PSTATE around an SDEI event, so a synchronous
exception taken by the handler overwrites the interrupted context's
ELR, SPSR, ESR and FAR. do_sdei_event() only notices that ELR changed,
and warns.
The interrupted context then carries on with the handler's state. A
task interrupted on its way into the kernel can be sent SIGILL for the
handler's kernel data abort. A task interrupted on its way back to user
space ERETs to EL1, at the handler's fixup address, with user registers
loaded.
With SDEI delivering NMI backtraces, this happens in normal operation.
The handler runs show_regs(), which reads through possibly-NULL pointers
with the _nofault() accessors. print_worker_info() faults this way for a
kworker that is not running a work item, and a single sysrq-l warned
once per such kworker.
Save ELR, SPSR, ESR and FAR in __sdei_handler() before
irqentry_nmi_enter(), which can take an exception too, and restore them
after irqentry_nmi_exit().
Once they are restored, a nested exception is harmless if its handler is
safe in NMI context. That holds for EL1 data aborts on translation,
permission and access-flag faults, which never take the mmap lock in NMI
context, and for BRK. Warn once, with the syndrome, about any other
exception class. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/mm: Fix global ASID handed out to two processes
On AMD CPUs with INVLPGB, two live processes can get the same MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE
global ASID value. The two then hit each other's TLB entries, so each can read
or corrupt the other's memory.
The global ASID space is managed lazily. When a global ASID is freed, its bit is
set in the global_asid_freed bitmap. Once the free ASID search reaches the end
of the global_asid_used bitmap, a global flush is done to really reclaim the
lazily freed global ASIDs.
However, the current code can assign the same global ASID to two different
processes, if one process is assigned MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE - 1, another process
MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE, and both stick around (keeping their global ASID numbers in
use) until the search wraps around again. At that point a third process could
also get assigned MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE.
the highest ASID stays in use, so it is not handed out again
last_global_asid stays below it, so no reset
the clear bits run out
find_next_zero_bit() returns MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE
global_asid_available > 0, so the failure is not caught
MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE is handed out as an ASID
A search only looks at the bits below MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE, so it cannot see that
this value is in use. The next failed search hands it out again, even if the
first process still holds it.
The fix used here is to reset the global ASID space after a failed search, and
to search again. If that search fails too, no global ASID is handed out.
The test for !global_asid_available is removed, because use_global_asid() only
calls allocate_global_asid() if global_asid_available > 0. The remaining test is
for a condition that should be impossible.
[ riel: simplify code, massage changelog and comment ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd: Force device table to maximum size
IOMMU can perform out-of-bounds read of the device table entry (DTE)
that is adjacent to the last DTE and falls outside the device table.
For example, if the device table can hold 0 to N-1 entries, then the
IOMMU can be made to fetch the Nth entry, which falls outside the
device table.
The device table is owned by the hypervisor (HV) and is assigned in 4KB
pages that are contiguous in system physical address (SPA). If the
out-of-bound DTE falls on a guest-owned page, then the guest can exploit
this bug to setup malicious table walks to corrupt HV pages and/or bring
down the system. Note that this bug does not manifest when the device
table size is set to its maximum size of 2MB.
Therefore, force the device table size to the maximum 2MB on affected
processors. These are CPU family 0x17 (Zen1/Zen2) through family 0x1a
(Zen5/BRH).
This is a mitigation for CVE-2024-21963.
kdump reuses the previous kernel's device table only when the size
encoded in the IOMMU device-table register matches
pci_seg->dev_table_size. A mixed rollout disagrees: the unpatched
kernel uses the IVRS-derived size and the patched kernel uses 2MB,
so __reuse_device_table() rejects the table. On SNP-capable IOMMUs
that rejection panics the kdump kernel. Kernels that both have this
patch agree on 2MB and reuse succeeds. Update the production kernel
and the crash kernel together. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ceph: clamp the inline data length in ceph_fill_inline_data()
The MDS decides how much inline data to attach to a reply, and the
client parses inline_len without any upper bound: ceph_decode_need()
only verifies that the message actually carries that many bytes.
ceph_fill_inline_data() then copies the data into a single folio
with no length check, so a malicious or buggy MDS returning more
inline data than the folio can hold writes past its end.
Clamp the length to folio_size() so both callers, handle_cap_grant()
and fill_inode(), are covered. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: clear ROAM flag when re-adding a pending local client
When a ROAMING_ADV is received for an announced local client,
batadv_tt_local_mark_removed() sets BATADV_TT_CLIENT_ROAM, queues a
DEL|ROAM change and marks the entry as BATADV_TT_CLIENT_PENDING. If the
client sends a frame again before the next TTVN commit,
batadv_tt_local_add_existing() only clears the PENDING flag and returns
early. The ADD cancels the queued DEL, but the entry keeps the ROAM flag:
* batadv_is_my_client() reports the client as not served by this node
* batadv_tt_local_client_is_roaming() reroutes unicast frames for it to
the node which sent the ROAMING_ADV
The ROAM flag is only removed with the next frame of the client.
Since BATADV_TT_CLIENT_ROAM is set together with BATADV_TT_CLIENT_PENDING,
it has to be cleared also at the same time with BATADV_TT_CLIENT_PENDING
when the client roamed back. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
batman-adv: tt: only update flags for TT events
In the first implementation of the translation table events, it was only
possible to announce:
* ADD: new locally detected client
* DEL: disappeared local client
If an ADD event was queued and then a DEL event was queued in the same
timeslot, it is valid to destroy both events because nothing actually
changed for remode nodes
But with commit 3c4f7ab60cc2 ("batman-adv: improve the TT component to
support runtime flag changes") and subsequent changes, it could also happen
that there are extra ADD events:
* ADD: _NEW_ locally detected client
* ADD: already existing client with new flags
* DEL: disappeared local client
The first and the last type of event could in theory still be removed
together from the (to be announced) events queue. But if the "update flags"
ADD is dropped together with the DEL, it would still leave global
translation table of a remote node in the incorrect state - believing that
the client didn't disappear.
If a detected client was previously announced, a DEL event must only
overwrite the "update flags" ADD but the DEL itself must still continue to
exist in the (to be anounced) events queue. For now, adjustment of the
announced flags is used for everything instead of dropping already queued
up events completely.
Similarly, a DEL followed by an ADD caused both entries to be deleted. But
the new ADD could announce flags changes which were not yet present for the
client before it was marked for DELetion. The new ADD must therefore only
overwrite the DEL - but still be kept. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ata: libata-scsi: reject data-in commands with a data-out buffer
SG_IO can submit a data-in SCSI command with DMA_TO_DEVICE. The
scatterlist can then contain pages pinned without write access.
ata_scsi_rbuf_fill() writes simulated replies to that scatterlist;
in the reported case, the copy tried to write the shared zero page
and faulted in the kernel.
The same mismatch can affect SG_IO commands translated by libata.
ZBC IN and GET PHYSICAL ELEMENT STATUS completion handlers can modify
the receive buffer even if the drive aborts the command. For ATAPI,
the successful INQUIRY completion also rewrites the buffer in
atapi_fixup_inquiry().
Reject these mismatched commands before the buffer is written or the
command is issued. Report ABORTED COMMAND / DATA IN BUFFER ERROR because
the CDB itself can be valid; the supplied transfer direction is wrong. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/arm-smmu-v3: Handle ARM erratum for CONT under invalidation with SVA
The erratum (MMU-700: #3777127, S3: #3673557) deals with under
invalidation of a CONT PTE grouping in the SMMU. The recommended work
around is to use a range invalidation that spans the entire CONT. The only
user of CONT in the kernel right now is through SVA sharing a CPU page
table that contains a CONT created by the mm.
Previously it was thought that this errata was dealt with because the
driver always uses range invalidation. However, there is a subtle detail
in the errata that the invalidation range must fully enclose the entire
CONT for it to work.
It seems that two sequential range invalidations, with a split point
falling inside a CONT grouping, will not prevent the errata.
The SMMU's range invalidation generation algorithm does not produce a
single invalidation for a single SVA invalidation request, nor does the mm
carefully align the SVA invalidation ranges to accommodate the splitting
of the invalidation into several ranges.
Thus, when processing a SVA invalidation, the range invalidation splitting
routine can generate a range invalidation that is split in the middle of
the CONT and risk under invalidation from this errata. This condition
could be triggered by a malicious userspace manipulating the TLB gathers
via mmap/mprotect/munmap.
Update the errata list to the include the S3 variation, detect the IOMMUs
that have it, and then have SVA invalidations use a simplified version of
the over invalidation algorithm from the tlbi rework series. This ensures
that a single range invalidation is issued for a single MMU notifier
callback and now the range invalidation is guarenteed to cover any posible
CONT.
Future work to add CONT to iommu_domain page tables should either use this
one-invalidate/one-range invalidation algorithm or disable CONT support in
the iommu_domain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: Use kvm_s2_fault_vma_info in gmem_abort()
gmem_abort() maps at s2fd->fault_ipa, which HPFAR_EL2 holds at 4K
granularity whatever the page size. The generic page-table code aligns
it, but pkvm_pgtable_stage2_map() looks up existing mappings over
[addr, addr + size), so on a pKVM host with pages larger than 4K a
guest_memfd-backed guest that faults past the first 4K of a page can
find its neighbour's mapping, get -EAGAIN and take the same fault
forever.
The memory fault exit reports s2fd->fault_ipa too, which for a nested
guest's fault is the nested IPA rather than the canonical one
kvm_gmem_get_pfn() failed on.
Take the addresses from kvm_s2_fault_vma_info instead, as
user_mem_abort() does, and report the canonical gfn in the memory fault
exit. kvm_s2_fault_get_vma_info() itself isn't called: a guest_memfd
memslot's userspace_addr doesn't need to be backed by a VMA. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to avoid folio->mapping dereference in is_{meta, node}_folio()
Otherwise, it may cause NULL pointer dereference in race condition:
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_setattr
- f2fs_truncate
- f2fs_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_do_truncate_blocks
- f2fs_truncate_inode_blocks
- truncate_dnode
- truncate_node
- invalidate_mapping_pages
- folio->mapping = NULL
- folio_lock
- is_node_folio
- F2FS_F_SB(folio): dereference on folio->mapping |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: hold shkey across socket migration
sctp_sock_migrate() transfers queued DATA skbs from the old socket to the
new one. skb_orphan() invokes sctp_wfree() during that transfer and drops
the skb-owned shared-key reference.
If userspace has removed that key from the association, this can be the
final reference. The following sctp_set_owner_w() then dereferences the
freed chunk->shkey while trying to take the new owner reference.
Take a temporary shared-key reference before orphaning the skb and release
it after the new owner has taken its reference. This preserves the selected
authentication key throughout the ownership transfer.
Bug found and triaged by OpenAI Security Research and
validated by Trail of Bits. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
sctp: re-point retained control chunks on association migration
sctp_sock_migrate() transfers DATA chunk ownership but leaves retained
control chunks pointing at the old socket. A later retransmission can
therefore access the socket after it has been freed.
Extend the migration walk to cover retained control chunks and use
sctp_control_set_owner_w() to assign their new owner. Reuse the DATA
ownership check so each chunk is processed once per pass, even when it
is reachable through multiple lists or retained pointers.
Preserve a control chunk's existing authentication key across migration
so its final release can still generate SCTP_AUTH_FREE_KEY when needed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: cros_usbpd_notify: Only use drvdata when parent is GOOG0004
cros_usbpd_notify_probe_acpi() takes the EC device pointer from
dev_get_drvdata(dev->parent) and assumes it is a struct cros_ec_device.
That only holds when GOOG0003 is a child of GOOG0004. On older devices
without that hierarchy, such as Google Nami, GOOG0003 and GOOG0004 are
siblings under the ACPI EC (PNP0C09):
PNP0C09:00 (acpi-ec)
|-- GOOG0003:00 (cros-usbpd-notify-acpi)
`-- GOOG0004:00 (cros_ec_lpcs)
Before commit db65a06d10b3 ("ACPI: EC: Convert the driver to a platform
one") the parent platform device had no driver data, so the driver
warned and continued without an EC pointer, as intended for these
devices. Since that commit the ACPI EC driver stores its struct acpi_ec
there, so the driver treats a struct acpi_ec as a struct cros_ec_device
and calls cros_ec_cmd() on it for every USB-C PD host event. Plugging
or unplugging a charger then intermittently oopses, followed by soft
lockups and a hung system:
BUG: unable to handle page fault for address: ffffffff9cf03220
#PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
Hardware name: Google Nami/Nami, BIOS 09/19/2019
Workqueue: kacpi_notify acpi_os_execute_deferred
RIP: 0010:native_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x29d/0x330
Call Trace:
_raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x59/0x80
__mutex_lock.constprop.0+0x129/0x930
cros_ec_cmd_xfer+0x2a/0xf0 [cros_ec_proto]
cros_ec_cmd_xfer_status+0x1a/0x90 [cros_ec_proto]
cros_ec_cmd+0xb7/0x140 [cros_ec_proto]
cros_usbpd_get_event_and_notify+0x42/0xc0 [cros_usbpd_notify]
acpi_ev_notify_dispatch+0x4e/0x70
acpi_os_execute_deferred+0x1a/0x30
Only read the parent's driver data when the parent's ACPI node is
GOOG0004, and otherwise continue without an EC pointer. While at it,
drop the reference taken by fwnode_get_parent(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/userfaultfd: only allocate anon_vma in CoW mappings
find_vma_and_prepare_anon() can end up allocating an anon_vma in VMAs that
are not CoW mappings, which is wrong.
If we have a MAP_SHARED R/O file mapped, we lack VM_SHARED (but do have
VM_MAYSHARE) and lack VM_MAYWRITE.
While uffd later rejects such mappings (uffd registration requires
VM_MAYWRITE, see comment in validate_dst_vma) find_vma_and_prepare_anon()
still wrongly allocates an anon vma before it validates the vma.
This in turn later confuses copy_page_range()->vma_needs_copy() such
that we end up calling copy_hugetlb_page_range() with ranges that
actually do not contain *any* per-pagetable information that would
require copying, which is the basis for PMD-table sharing in the first
place.
copy_hugetlb_page_range() should not have to worry about shared
PMD tables at all: it doesn't make any sense to copy page tables that are
shared, as they can be fully recreated later. Ending up in the function
with shareable page tables is the real issue.
If a destination PMD table is shared in copy_hugetlb_page_range(), it
might get concurrently unshared as we are not holding relevant
locks, resulting in us using a page table that is no longer mapped and
possibly freed after calling:
dst_pte = huge_pte_alloc(dst, dst_vma, addr, sz);
To fix it, do not allocate an anon_vma in non-CoW mappings and add a
safety guard to copy_hugetlb_page_range(), making sure that we never
end up messing with shared PMD tables in there.
Before commit 867a43a34ff8a ("userfaultfd: use per-vma locks in userfaultfd
operations") we would always validate the VMA before allocating an
anon_vma, and consequently never wrongly allocate an anon_vma.
As uffd_lock_vma() is part of the same lookup machinery and
also contains a misleading VM_SHARED check, change that one as well
directly for consistency.
A follow-up cleanup will stop taking the hugetlb_vma_lock_read(src_vma)
lock in copy_hugetlb_page_range() entirely. Further, the usage of
VM_SHARED in userfaultfd code should be cleaned up later to focus on
CoW vs. non-CoW mappings. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/shmem: honour F_SEAL_EXEC when an ACL is set
The owner of a memfd sealed with F_SEAL_EXEC can still change its
execute bits by setting a POSIX access ACL. With CONFIG_TMPFS_POSIX_ACL,
this lets an unprivileged owner make a non-executable memfd executable,
bypassing vm.memfd_noexec=2.
simple_set_acl() updates i_mode directly, bypassing the seal check in
shmem_setattr(). Add shmem_set_acl() to check the resulting mode. Share
the F_SEAL_EXEC check with shmem_setattr() using memfd_check_seals_mode()
in include/linux/memfd.h.
Fix generated by an LLM and sent by Chris Mason in private.
[ david: use common helper; simplify description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: rtw88: usb: route bmc frames via the high queue only for DTIM delivery
In AP mode every broadcast and multicast data frame is routed to
TX_DESC_QSEL_HIGH, the after-DTIM queue, whether or not anybody is
asleep. The firmware drains that queue at beacon pace, a dozen or so
frames per second measured on RTL8822BU, while one associated client's
mDNS/SSDP chatter alone exceeds that. The excess accumulates inside
the chip until the shared TX page pool is exhausted (measured: 14 of
1803 pages left). From that point every host-sourced frame queues
behind the backlog: authentication responses reach the air seconds
after the client has given up, so no station can associate anymore,
and the beacon reserved-page download fails the BCN_VALID poll
("error beacon valid") because it needs pages from the same pool. The
AP keeps beaconing, so the failure looks like a silent RX stall and
only a reboot recovers.
mac80211 already decides when after-DTIM delivery is needed: it sets
IEEE80211_TX_CTL_SEND_AFTER_DTIM on bmc frames only while at least one
station is actually dozing. Honor that instead of routing
unconditionally: flagged frames keep going through the high queue with
the MORE_DATA and HGQMD handling introduced by commit 076f786a0ae1
("wifi: rtw88: Fix AP mode incorrect DTIM behavior"), everything else
leaves at line rate through the AC queues. This partially reverts the
usb.c hunk of that commit, whose unconditional routing is what lets
the backlog build up.
On a bench AP (USB2, 20 MHz, WPA2, hostapd, a Windows client driven
through disconnect/reconnect cycles): reconnects fail 0/5 on RTL8822BU
and 0/3 on RTL8821CU before this change, and pass 10/10 and 5/5 with
it, with the page pool staying healthy and no beacon errors logged. |