| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gfs2: Validate i_depth for exhash directories
A fuzzer test introduced corruption that ends up with a depth of 0 in
dir_e_read(), causing an undefined shift by 32 at:
index = hash >> (32 - dip->i_depth);
As calculated in an open-coded way in dir_make_exhash(), the minimum
depth for an exhash directory is ilog2(sdp->sd_hash_ptrs) and 0 is
invalid as sdp->sd_hash_ptrs is fixed as sdp->bsize / 16 at mount time.
So we can avoid the undefined behaviour by checking for depth values
lower than the minimum in gfs2_dinode_in(). Values greater than the
maximum are already being checked for there.
Also switch the calculation in dir_make_exhash() to use ilog2() to
clarify how the depth is calculated.
Tested with the syzkaller repro.c and xfstests '-g quick'. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftrace: Also allocate and copy hash for reading of filter files
Currently the reader of set_ftrace_filter and set_ftrace_notrace just adds
the pointer to the global tracer hash to its iterator. Unlike the writer
that allocates a copy of the hash, the reader keeps the pointer to the
filter hashes. This is problematic because this pointer is static across
function calls that release the locks that can update the global tracer
hashes. This can cause UAF and similar bugs.
Allocate and copy the hash for reading the filter files like it is done
for the writers. This not only fixes UAF bugs, but also makes the code a
bit simpler as it doesn't have to differentiate when to free the
iterator's hash between writers and readers. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dm: Always split write BIOs to zoned device limits
Any zoned DM target that requires zone append emulation will use the
block layer zone write plugging. In such case, DM target drivers must
not split BIOs using dm_accept_partial_bio() as doing so can potentially
lead to deadlocks with queue freeze operations. Regular write operations
used to emulate zone append operations also cannot be split by the
target driver as that would result in an invalid writen sector value
return using the BIO sector.
In order for zoned DM target drivers to avoid such incorrect BIO
splitting, we must ensure that large BIOs are split before being passed
to the map() function of the target, thus guaranteeing that the
limits for the mapped device are not exceeded.
dm-crypt and dm-flakey are the only target drivers supporting zoned
devices and using dm_accept_partial_bio().
In the case of dm-crypt, this function is used to split BIOs to the
internal max_write_size limit (which will be suppressed in a different
patch). However, since crypt_alloc_buffer() uses a bioset allowing only
up to BIO_MAX_VECS (256) vectors in a BIO. The dm-crypt device
max_segments limit, which is not set and so default to BLK_MAX_SEGMENTS
(128), must thus be respected and write BIOs split accordingly.
In the case of dm-flakey, since zone append emulation is not required,
the block layer zone write plugging is not used and no splitting of BIOs
required.
Modify the function dm_zone_bio_needs_split() to use the block layer
helper function bio_needs_zone_write_plugging() to force a call to
bio_split_to_limits() in dm_split_and_process_bio(). This allows DM
target drivers to avoid using dm_accept_partial_bio() for write
operations on zoned DM devices. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slub: avoid accessing metadata when pointer is invalid in object_err()
object_err() reports details of an object for further debugging, such as
the freelist pointer, redzone, etc. However, if the pointer is invalid,
attempting to access object metadata can lead to a crash since it does
not point to a valid object.
One known path to the crash is when alloc_consistency_checks()
determines the pointer to the allocated object is invalid because of a
freelist corruption, and calls object_err() to report it. The debug code
should report and handle the corruption gracefully and not crash in the
process.
In case the pointer is NULL or check_valid_pointer() returns false for
the pointer, only print the pointer value and skip accessing metadata. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i40e: fix validation of VF state in get resources
VF state I40E_VF_STATE_ACTIVE is not the only state in which
VF is actually active so it should not be used to determine
if a VF is allowed to obtain resources.
Use I40E_VF_STATE_RESOURCES_LOADED that is set only in
i40e_vc_get_vf_resources_msg() and cleared during reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix metadata_dst leak __bpf_redirect_neigh_v{4,6}
Cilium has a BPF egress gateway feature which forces outgoing K8s Pod
traffic to pass through dedicated egress gateways which then SNAT the
traffic in order to interact with stable IPs outside the cluster.
The traffic is directed to the gateway via vxlan tunnel in collect md
mode. A recent BPF change utilized the bpf_redirect_neigh() helper to
forward packets after the arrival and decap on vxlan, which turned out
over time that the kmalloc-256 slab usage in kernel was ever-increasing.
The issue was that vxlan allocates the metadata_dst object and attaches
it through a fake dst entry to the skb. The latter was never released
though given bpf_redirect_neigh() was merely setting the new dst entry
via skb_dst_set() without dropping an existing one first. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/vm: Clear the scratch_pt pointer on error
Avoid triggering a dereference of an error pointer on cleanup in
xe_vm_free_scratch() by clearing any scratch_pt error pointer.
(cherry picked from commit 358ee50ab565f3c8ea32480e9d03127a81ba32f8) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/debug_vm_pgtable: clear page table entries at destroy_args()
The mm/debug_vm_pagetable test allocates manually page table entries for
the tests it runs, using also its manually allocated mm_struct. That in
itself is ok, but when it exits, at destroy_args() it fails to clear those
entries with the *_clear functions.
The problem is that leaves stale entries. If another process allocates an
mm_struct with a pgd at the same address, it may end up running into the
stale entry. This is happening in practice on a debug kernel with
CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE=y, for example this is the output with some extra
debugging I added (it prints a warning trace if pgtables_bytes goes
negative, in addition to the warning at check_mm() function):
[ 2.539353] debug_vm_pgtable: [get_random_vaddr ]: random_vaddr is 0x7ea247140000
[ 2.539366] kmem_cache info
[ 2.539374] kmem_cachep 0x000000002ce82385 - freelist 0x0000000000000000 - offset 0x508
[ 2.539447] debug_vm_pgtable: [init_args ]: args->mm is 0x000000002267cc9e
(...)
[ 2.552800] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 116 at include/linux/mm.h:2841 free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[ 2.552816] Modules linked in:
[ 2.552843] CPU: 5 UID: 0 PID: 116 Comm: modprobe Not tainted 6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug #1 VOLUNTARY
[ 2.552859] Hardware name: IBM,9009-41A POWER9 (architected) 0x4e0202 0xf000005 of:IBM,FW910.00 (VL910_062) hv:phyp pSeries
[ 2.552872] NIP: c0000000007eef3c LR: c0000000007eef30 CTR: c0000000003d8c90
[ 2.552885] REGS: c0000000622e73b0 TRAP: 0700 Not tainted (6.12.0-105.debug_vm2.el10.ppc64le+debug)
[ 2.552899] MSR: 800000000282b033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 24002822 XER: 0000000a
[ 2.552954] CFAR: c0000000008f03f0 IRQMASK: 0
[ 2.552954] GPR00: c0000000007eef30 c0000000622e7650 c000000002b1ac00 0000000000000001
[ 2.552954] GPR04: 0000000000000008 0000000000000000 c0000000007eef30 ffffffffffffffff
[ 2.552954] GPR08: 00000000ffff00f5 0000000000000001 0000000000000048 0000000000004000
[ 2.552954] GPR12: 00000003fa440000 c000000017ffa300 c0000000051d9f80 ffffffffffffffdb
[ 2.552954] GPR16: 0000000000000000 0000000000000008 000000000000000a 60000000000000e0
[ 2.552954] GPR20: 4080000000000000 c0000000113af038 00007fffcf130000 0000700000000000
[ 2.552954] GPR24: c000000062a6a000 0000000000000001 8000000062a68000 0000000000000001
[ 2.552954] GPR28: 000000000000000a c000000062ebc600 0000000000002000 c000000062ebc760
[ 2.553170] NIP [c0000000007eef3c] free_pud_range+0x8bc/0x8d0
[ 2.553185] LR [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0
[ 2.553199] Call Trace:
[ 2.553207] [c0000000622e7650] [c0000000007eef30] free_pud_range+0x8b0/0x8d0 (unreliable)
[ 2.553229] [c0000000622e7750] [c0000000007f40b4] free_pgd_range+0x284/0x3b0
[ 2.553248] [c0000000622e7800] [c0000000007f4630] free_pgtables+0x450/0x570
[ 2.553274] [c0000000622e78e0] [c0000000008161c0] exit_mmap+0x250/0x650
[ 2.553292] [c0000000622e7a30] [c0000000001b95b8] __mmput+0x98/0x290
[ 2.558344] [c0000000622e7a80] [c0000000001d1018] exit_mm+0x118/0x1b0
[ 2.558361] [c0000000622e7ac0] [c0000000001d141c] do_exit+0x2ec/0x870
[ 2.558376] [c0000000622e7b60] [c0000000001d1ca8] do_group_exit+0x88/0x150
[ 2.558391] [c0000000622e7bb0] [c0000000001d1db8] sys_exit_group+0x48/0x50
[ 2.558407] [c0000000622e7be0] [c00000000003d810] system_call_exception+0x1e0/0x4c0
[ 2.558423] [c0000000622e7e50] [c00000000000d05c] system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
(...)
[ 2.558892] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 2.559022] BUG: Bad rss-counter state mm:000000002267cc9e type:MM_ANONPAGES val:1
[ 2.559037] BUG: non-zero pgtables_bytes on freeing mm: -6144
Here the modprobe process ended up with an allocated mm_struct from the
mm_struct slab that was used before by the debug_vm_pgtable test. That is
not a problem, since the mm_stru
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Limit access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed
When the length of the string written to set_ftrace_filter exceeds
FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, the following KASAN alarm will be triggered:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
Read of size 1 at addr ffff0000d00bd5ba by task ash/165
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 165 Comm: ash Not tainted 6.16.0-g6bcdbd62bd56-dirty
Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
Call trace:
show_stack+0x34/0x50 (C)
dump_stack_lvl+0xa0/0x158
print_address_description.constprop.0+0x88/0x398
print_report+0xb0/0x280
kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
__asan_report_load1_noabort+0x20/0x30
strsep+0x18c/0x1b0
ftrace_process_regex.isra.0+0x100/0x2d8
ftrace_regex_release+0x484/0x618
__fput+0x364/0xa58
____fput+0x28/0x40
task_work_run+0x154/0x278
do_notify_resume+0x1f0/0x220
el0_svc+0xec/0xf0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xa0/0xe8
el0t_64_sync+0x1ac/0x1b0
The reason is that trace_get_user will fail when processing a string
longer than FTRACE_BUFF_MAX, but not set the end of parser->buffer to 0.
Then an OOB access will be triggered in ftrace_regex_release->
ftrace_process_regex->strsep->strpbrk. We can solve this problem by
limiting access to parser->buffer when trace_get_user failed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: Don't call reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_conn_request().
syzbot reported the splat below in tcp_conn_request(). [0]
If a listener is close()d while a TFO socket is being processed in
tcp_conn_request(), inet_csk_reqsk_queue_add() does not set reqsk->sk
and calls inet_child_forget(), which calls tcp_disconnect() for the
TFO socket.
After the cited commit, tcp_disconnect() calls reqsk_fastopen_remove(),
where reqsk_put() is called due to !reqsk->sk.
Then, reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_conn_request() decrements the
last req->rsk_refcnt and frees reqsk, and __reqsk_free() at the
drop_and_free label causes the refcount underflow for the listener
and double-free of the reqsk.
Let's remove reqsk_fastopen_remove() in tcp_conn_request().
Note that other callers make sure tp->fastopen_rsk is not NULL.
[0]:
refcount_t: underflow; use-after-free.
WARNING: CPU: 12 PID: 5563 at lib/refcount.c:28 refcount_warn_saturate (lib/refcount.c:28)
Modules linked in:
CPU: 12 UID: 0 PID: 5563 Comm: syz-executor Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/12/2025
RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate (lib/refcount.c:28)
Code: ab e8 8e b4 98 ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc cc 80 3d a4 e4 d6 01 00 75 9c c6 05 9b e4 d6 01 01 48 c7 c7 e8 df fb ab e8 6a b4 98 ff <0f> 0b e9 03 5b 76 00 cc 80 3d 7d e4 d6 01 00 0f 85 74 ff ff ff c6
RSP: 0018:ffffa79fc0304a98 EFLAGS: 00010246
RAX: d83af4db1c6b3900 RBX: ffff9f65c7a69020 RCX: d83af4db1c6b3900
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffff7fff RDI: ffffffffac78a280
RBP: 000000009d781b60 R08: 0000000000007fff R09: ffffffffac6ca280
R10: 0000000000017ffd R11: 0000000000000004 R12: ffff9f65c7b4f100
R13: ffff9f65c7d23c00 R14: ffff9f65c7d26000 R15: ffff9f65c7a64ef8
FS: 00007f9f962176c0(0000) GS:ffff9f65fcf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 0000200000000180 CR3: 000000000dbbe006 CR4: 0000000000372ef0
Call Trace:
<IRQ>
tcp_conn_request (./include/linux/refcount.h:400 ./include/linux/refcount.h:432 ./include/linux/refcount.h:450 ./include/net/sock.h:1965 ./include/net/request_sock.h:131 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7301)
tcp_rcv_state_process (net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6708)
tcp_v6_do_rcv (net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1670)
tcp_v6_rcv (net/ipv6/tcp_ipv6.c:1906)
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:438)
ip6_input (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:500)
ipv6_rcv (net/ipv6/ip6_input.c:311)
__netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6104)
process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6456)
__napi_poll (net/core/dev.c:7506)
net_rx_action (net/core/dev.c:7569 net/core/dev.c:7696)
handle_softirqs (kernel/softirq.c:579)
do_softirq (kernel/softirq.c:480)
</IRQ> |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix invalid accesses to ceph_connection_v1_info
There is a place where generic code in messenger.c is reading and
another place where it is writing to con->v1 union member without
checking that the union member is active (i.e. msgr1 is in use).
On 64-bit systems, con->v1.auth_retry overlaps with con->v2.out_iter,
so such a read is almost guaranteed to return a bogus value instead of
0 when msgr2 is in use. This ends up being fairly benign because the
side effect is just the invalidation of the authorizer and successive
fetching of new tickets.
con->v1.connect_seq overlaps with con->v2.conn_bufs and the fact that
it's being written to can cause more serious consequences, but luckily
it's not something that happens often. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
uio_hv_generic: Let userspace take care of interrupt mask
Remove the logic to set interrupt mask by default in uio_hv_generic
driver as the interrupt mask value is supposed to be controlled
completely by the user space. If the mask bit gets changed
by the driver, concurrently with user mode operating on the ring,
the mask bit may be set when it is supposed to be clear, and the
user-mode driver will miss an interrupt which will cause a hang.
For eg- when the driver sets inbound ring buffer interrupt mask to 1,
the host does not interrupt the guest on the UIO VMBus channel.
However, setting the mask does not prevent the host from putting a
message in the inbound ring buffer. So let’s assume that happens,
the host puts a message into the ring buffer but does not interrupt.
Subsequently, the user space code in the guest sets the inbound ring
buffer interrupt mask to 0, saying “Hey, I’m ready for interrupts”.
User space code then calls pread() to wait for an interrupt.
Then one of two things happens:
* The host never sends another message. So the pread() waits forever.
* The host does send another message. But because there’s already a
message in the ring buffer, it doesn’t generate an interrupt.
This is the correct behavior, because the host should only send an
interrupt when the inbound ring buffer transitions from empty to
not-empty. Adding an additional message to a ring buffer that is not
empty is not supposed to generate an interrupt on the guest.
Since the guest is waiting in pread() and not removing messages from
the ring buffer, the pread() waits forever.
This could be easily reproduced in hv_fcopy_uio_daemon if we delay
setting interrupt mask to 0.
Similarly if hv_uio_channel_cb() sets the interrupt_mask to 1,
there’s a race condition. Once user space empties the inbound ring
buffer, but before user space sets interrupt_mask to 0, the host could
put another message in the ring buffer but it wouldn’t interrupt.
Then the next pread() would hang.
Fix these by removing all instances where interrupt_mask is changed,
while keeping the one in set_event() unchanged to enable userspace
control the interrupt mask by writing 0/1 to /dev/uioX. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xsk: Harden userspace-supplied xdp_desc validation
Turned out certain clearly invalid values passed in xdp_desc from
userspace can pass xp_{,un}aligned_validate_desc() and then lead
to UBs or just invalid frames to be queued for xmit.
desc->len close to ``U32_MAX`` with a non-zero pool->tx_metadata_len
can cause positive integer overflow and wraparound, the same way low
enough desc->addr with a non-zero pool->tx_metadata_len can cause
negative integer overflow. Both scenarios can then pass the
validation successfully.
This doesn't happen with valid XSk applications, but can be used
to perform attacks.
Always promote desc->len to ``u64`` first to exclude positive
overflows of it. Use explicit check_{add,sub}_overflow() when
validating desc->addr (which is ``u64`` already).
bloat-o-meter reports a little growth of the code size:
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/1 up/down: 60/-16 (44)
Function old new delta
xskq_cons_peek_desc 299 330 +31
xsk_tx_peek_release_desc_batch 973 1002 +29
xsk_generic_xmit 3148 3132 -16
but hopefully this doesn't hurt the performance much. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nft_objref: validate objref and objrefmap expressions
Referencing a synproxy stateful object from OUTPUT hook causes kernel
crash due to infinite recursive calls:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at 000000008bda5b8c (stack is 000000003ab1c4a5..00000000494d8b12)
[...]
Call Trace:
__find_rr_leaf+0x99/0x230
fib6_table_lookup+0x13b/0x2d0
ip6_pol_route+0xa4/0x400
fib6_rule_lookup+0x156/0x240
ip6_route_output_flags+0xc6/0x150
__nf_ip6_route+0x23/0x50
synproxy_send_tcp_ipv6+0x106/0x200
synproxy_send_client_synack_ipv6+0x1aa/0x1f0
nft_synproxy_do_eval+0x263/0x310
nft_do_chain+0x5a8/0x5f0 [nf_tables
nft_do_chain_inet+0x98/0x110
nf_hook_slow+0x43/0xc0
__ip6_local_out+0xf0/0x170
ip6_local_out+0x17/0x70
synproxy_send_tcp_ipv6+0x1a2/0x200
synproxy_send_client_synack_ipv6+0x1aa/0x1f0
[...]
Implement objref and objrefmap expression validate functions.
Currently, only NFT_OBJECT_SYNPROXY object type requires validation.
This will also handle a jump to a chain using a synproxy object from the
OUTPUT hook.
Now when trying to reference a synproxy object in the OUTPUT hook, nft
will produce the following error:
synproxy_crash.nft: Error: Could not process rule: Operation not supported
synproxy name mysynproxy
^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^ |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix smbdirect_recv_io leak in smbd_negotiate() error path
During tests of another unrelated patch I was able to trigger this
error: Objects remaining on __kmem_cache_shutdown() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ipvs: Defer ip_vs_ftp unregister during netns cleanup
On the netns cleanup path, __ip_vs_ftp_exit() may unregister ip_vs_ftp
before connections with valid cp->app pointers are flushed, leading to a
use-after-free.
Fix this by introducing a global `exiting_module` flag, set to true in
ip_vs_ftp_exit() before unregistering the pernet subsystem. In
__ip_vs_ftp_exit(), skip ip_vs_ftp unregister if called during netns
cleanup (when exiting_module is false) and defer it to
__ip_vs_cleanup_batch(), which unregisters all apps after all connections
are flushed. If called during module exit, unregister ip_vs_ftp
immediately. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/smc: fix one NULL pointer dereference in smc_ib_is_sg_need_sync()
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 00000000000002ec
PGD 0 P4D 0
Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
CPU: 28 UID: 0 PID: 343 Comm: kworker/28:1 Kdump: loaded Tainted: G OE 6.17.0-rc2+ #9 NONE
Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE, [E]=UNSIGNED_MODULE
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
Workqueue: smc_hs_wq smc_listen_work [smc]
RIP: 0010:smc_ib_is_sg_need_sync+0x9e/0xd0 [smc]
...
Call Trace:
<TASK>
smcr_buf_map_link+0x211/0x2a0 [smc]
__smc_buf_create+0x522/0x970 [smc]
smc_buf_create+0x3a/0x110 [smc]
smc_find_rdma_v2_device_serv+0x18f/0x240 [smc]
? smc_vlan_by_tcpsk+0x7e/0xe0 [smc]
smc_listen_find_device+0x1dd/0x2b0 [smc]
smc_listen_work+0x30f/0x580 [smc]
process_one_work+0x18c/0x340
worker_thread+0x242/0x360
kthread+0xe7/0x220
ret_from_fork+0x13a/0x160
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
If the software RoCE device is used, ibdev->dma_device is a null pointer.
As a result, the problem occurs. Null pointer detection is added to
prevent problems. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/amd/pgtbl: Fix possible race while increase page table level
The AMD IOMMU host page table implementation supports dynamic page table levels
(up to 6 levels), starting with a 3-level configuration that expands based on
IOVA address. The kernel maintains a root pointer and current page table level
to enable proper page table walks in alloc_pte()/fetch_pte() operations.
The IOMMU IOVA allocator initially starts with 32-bit address and onces its
exhuasted it switches to 64-bit address (max address is determined based
on IOMMU and device DMA capability). To support larger IOVA, AMD IOMMU
driver increases page table level.
But in unmap path (iommu_v1_unmap_pages()), fetch_pte() reads
pgtable->[root/mode] without lock. So its possible that in exteme corner case,
when increase_address_space() is updating pgtable->[root/mode], fetch_pte()
reads wrong page table level (pgtable->mode). It does compare the value with
level encoded in page table and returns NULL. This will result is
iommu_unmap ops to fail and upper layer may retry/log WARN_ON.
CPU 0 CPU 1
------ ------
map pages unmap pages
alloc_pte() -> increase_address_space() iommu_v1_unmap_pages() -> fetch_pte()
pgtable->root = pte (new root value)
READ pgtable->[mode/root]
Reads new root, old mode
Updates mode (pgtable->mode += 1)
Since Page table level updates are infrequent and already synchronized with a
spinlock, implement seqcount to enable lock-free read operations on the read path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vxlan: mdb: Fix source list corruption on a failed replace
When replacing the source list of an MDB remote entry, all existing
sources are first marked for deletion and vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add()
is then called to add the new source list. Sources present in the new
list have their deletion mark cleared, and any sources left marked
afterwards are removed.
If vxlan_mdb_remote_srcs_add() fails partway through, its error path
deletes all entries on the remote's source list. That rollback is only
correct for its other caller, vxlan_mdb_remote_add(), where the remote
was just allocated and the list contains solely entries added during
the call. On the replace path the list also holds pre-existing sources,
so a failed replace tears them down together with their (S, G)
forwarding entries instead of leaving the entry unchanged.
This is reachable from an existing (*, G) remote. An EXCLUDE filter
that loses sources starts forwarding traffic that should be blocked,
while an INCLUDE filter that loses sources drops traffic that should be
forwarded.
Mark entries created during the current pass with a new
VXLAN_SGRP_F_NEW flag. On failure, delete only those entries and clear
the deletion mark on the pre-existing ones, so a failed replace leaves
the source list untouched. Retain the flag until the whole operation
succeeds and then clear it. Also stop vxlan_mdb_remote_src_add() from
deleting a pre-existing entry it only looked up when adding that
entry's forwarding entry fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ntfs3: reject direct userspace writes to reserved $LX* xattrs
NTFS3 uses $LXUID, $LXGID, $LXMOD and $LXDEV as internal WSL
permission metadata and reloads them into i_uid, i_gid and i_mode
from ntfs_get_wsl_perm().
Because the empty-prefix xattr handler also lets file owners call
setxattr() on these names directly, an unprivileged writer on a
writable ntfs3 mount can plant root ownership and S_ISUID on their own
file and gain euid 0 after inode reload.
Reject direct userspace writes to the reserved $LX* names. Internal
ntfs3 metadata updates are unchanged because ntfs_save_wsl_perm()
writes them via ntfs_set_ea() directly.
[almaz.alexandrovich@paragon-software.com: added an additional check for non privileged users] |