| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to execute code over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Bluetooth Driver allows an unauthorized attacker to elevate privileges with a physical attack. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Word allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| The STM32WBA IEEE 802.15.4 driver in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_stm32wba.c computed the packet length of a received frame as pkt_len = rx_frame->length - IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH without first checking that the radio-reported length could hold an FCS. pkt_len is a uint8_t, so a reported length of 0 or 1 wrapped to 254 or 255. The only bound on the resulting value was __ASSERT_NO_MSG(pkt_len <= CONFIG_NET_BUF_DATA_SIZE), which compiles to nothing in the default production configuration (CONFIG_ASSERT=n).
The length originates in the ST link-layer receive-done metadata (p_metadata->length, stored by stm32wba_802154_receive_done()), and ultimately in the PHY header of a frame received over the air, so it is influenced by any attacker within radio range of the device. Reaching the underflow requires the vendor link layer to surface a frame shorter than the FCS with no error; the driver performed no validation of its own on that value.
When the underflow occurs, stm32wba_802154_rx_thread() calls net_pkt_write(pkt, rx_frame->psdu, pkt_len) with a length of about 254 bytes against a receive buffer that holds at most one PHY packet (IEEE802154_MAX_PHY_PACKET_SIZE, 127 bytes). This reads roughly 128 bytes past the end of the radio receive buffer and copies that adjacent memory into a network packet that is submitted to the networking stack, giving an out-of-bounds read with a potential disclosure of adjacent RAM plus needless oversized packet allocation in the RX thread.
The fix rejects a frame whose reported length is smaller than IEEE802154_FCS_LENGTH before the subtraction, and replaces the compiled-out assertion with a runtime length check that drops oversized frames — matching the runtime check already present in drivers/ieee802154/ieee802154_nrf5.c. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Overlay Filter allows an authorized attacker to execute code locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Windows Media Foundation allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Client for NFS allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Client for NFS allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| libIEC61850 is an open-source implementation of IEC 61850 client and server protocols including MMS, GOOSE, Sampled Values, and R-Session. Prior to 1.6.2, checkDataSetAccess reverses the source and destination arguments to StringUtils_copyStringToBuffer while constructing an MMS_ASSOCIATION_SPECIFIC dataset reference. The helper treats uninitialized dataSetRef[130] storage as a source string, causing strlen to read beyond the stack buffer, and then copies those bytes into the caller-owned listName buffer. A remote defineNamedVariableList request can crash servers that have dynamic dataset service enabled and a dataset access handler installed; the advisory also observes caller stack corruption but establishes denial of service as the primary impact. This issue is fixed in version 1.6.2. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Microsoft Office Excel allows an unauthorized attacker to disclose information over a network. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows DWM Core Library allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c validates only that the first net_buf of a received frame holds a plain 14-byte struct net_eth_hdr. When the ethertype is 0x8100 and VLAN is enabled on the interface, the same buffer is reinterpreted as the 18-byte struct net_eth_vlan_hdr without re-checking the length: the VLAN TCI and the inner ethertype are read from offsets 14..17, past pkt->buffer->len, and hdr_len is raised to 18 so the subsequent net_buf_pull() removes more bytes than the buffer holds.
A single unauthenticated frame of 14 to 17 bytes carrying the VLAN ethertype triggers this. No knowledge of the node's VLAN configuration is needed: net_eth_get_vlan_iface() returns the base interface for the priority tag 0, and a broadcast destination address satisfies the "frame is for me" test, so a 16-byte broadcast frame with ethertype 0x8100 and TCI 0x0000 reaches the pull. Nothing in the receive path enforces the 60-byte Ethernet minimum — the USB CDC ECM and CDC NCM gadget classes in particular hand host-supplied frames of any non-zero length straight to net_recv_data().
With assertions enabled, net_buf_simple_pull() asserts and the node panics. In a production build (assertions and CONFIG_NET_BUF_HARDENING off) the uint16_t buffer length underflows to 65534 and buf->data is advanced past the end of the fragment's storage, so every later parser reads far outside the buffer and any net_buf_add() on that fragment computes tailroom from the underflowed length. The result is a reliable remote denial of service and out-of-bounds access with information-disclosure and corruption potential.
Only configurations built with CONFIG_NET_VLAN=y that have a VLAN enabled on the receiving Ethernet interface, and whose MAC does not strip VLAN tags in hardware (ETHERNET_HW_VLAN_TAG_STRIP), are affected. The fix rejects the frame before the tag is read, so hdr_len is thereafter either 14 or 18 with both sizes validated against pkt->buffer->len. |
| miniupnpc through 2.3.3 contains a one-byte heap out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the minixml parseatt function that allows malicious UPnP gateways to read past buffer bounds via crafted replies. Attackers on the local network can spoof a gateway serving device descriptions or SOAP responses ending in '=' to crash the client. |
| vgmstream through r2117 contains a stack out-of-bounds read vulnerability in the G.722.1/Siren14 decoder in g7221_lib.c, whose bit reader refills without checking the data_u32 array end. Attackers can supply crafted .s14 or .sss files that drive decode_vector_quantized_mlt_indices() past the stack buffer during format detection, crashing the application. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Universal Disk Format File System Driver (UDFS) allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Audio Service allows an authorized attacker to disclose information locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read in Windows Sysmain Service allows an authorized attacker to elevate privileges locally. |
| Out-of-bounds read and write in the CPC sketch deserialization of Apache DataSketches C++ (repo: datasketches-cpp).
A crafted serialized CPC sketch passed to cpc_sketch::deserialize(), from either a byte buffer or a stream, can cause the decompressor to read past the end of the compressed data, because the read position was only checked after decoding finished. In the hybrid flavor, it can also cause a write outside an internal heap buffer, because decoded row indices were not validated. Several other header fields and decoded values, including lg_k, were also not validated. This can corrupt heap memory, causing a crash and potentially enabling further exploitation.
This issue affects Apache DataSketches C++: from 2.0.0-incubating before 5.3.0. Only applications that deserialize CPC sketches from untrusted sources are affected.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 5.3.0, which fixes this issue. |