| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, in the official apps/epics client tool on v1.6.0-rc1 (not in the generic BACnet RPM ACK decoder alone) a malicious BACnet/IP endpoint can reply to the EPICS tool’s legitimate ReadPropertyMultiple request with a syntactically valid ReadPropertyMultiple-ACK that contains more heading properties than the tool’s fixed local storage can hold. The response is decoded successfully and later consumed by ProcessRPMData(), which writes property values into a fixed global array using an unbounded linear index. This results in a reproducible global-buffer-overflow in apps/epics/main.c. This is a network-reachable memory corruption in the official epics tool’s response-processing path. The root cause is that apps/epics treats a remotely supplied variable-length RPM property list as if it were a trusted, fixed-size local heading-property set. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.4, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, a stack-based out-of-bounds write exists in the Notification Class object implementation when handling AddListElement for the recipient-list property. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.4, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. From versions 1.4.0 to before 1.4.4, and 1.5.0 to before 1.5.1, an uninitialized value use vulnerability in bacnet-stack's AtomicReadFile record-access ACK encoder allows unauthenticated remote attackers to corrupt the encoded OCTET STRING length and payload boundary in network responses by sending a crafted AtomicReadFile request that reaches a successful record-access path. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, the BACnet/SC message decoder walks the header-option list by following each option's MORE bit. Nothing rejects a list whose last option still has the MORE bit set, and the decode walk has no upper bound on how many options it processes. A single crafted BVLC-SC frame makes the walk advance one option past the end of the message and read message[message_len], one byte out of bounds. When the bytes after the message carry more MORE-set option markers, the walk keeps going: it runs past the fixed 4-entry option array and writes decoded option fields out of bounds. On the server that decode array is the static global bsc_dm, so the out-of-bounds write lands in adjacent BSS. Both faults are reachable before authentication, from the first frame a peer sends on a BACnet/SC connection, and the bytes that follow the message are the same peer's prior-frame data. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, and 1.6.1, bws_cli_connect() in ports/linux/websocket-cli.c loads the trusted CA cert into the libwebsockets context, then always sets LCCSCF_ALLOW_SELFSIGNED in the connection flags. So lws accepts any self-signed hub certificate, whether or not it chains to the loaded CA. A BACnet/SC node finishes the TLS handshake to a rogue hub that presents a self-signed cert. It then hands the attacker its identity (VMAC, UUID) and all later BACnet traffic. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.2, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the RAMFS-backed FILE object implementation stores appended records as NUL-terminated strings, but its record-counting logic later walks the buffer as if an additional terminating empty record were present. As a result, two consecutive AtomicWriteFile(record-access) append requests can cause record_count() to call bacnet_strnlen() on a pointer that is already one byte past the end of the heap allocation. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, there is a remote global-buffer-overflow in the official router-ipv6 application shipped with bacnet-stack, this results in an out-of-bounds write to the global transmit buffer under ASan. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, the bsc_node_parse_urls() function in src/bacnet/datalink/bsc/bsc-node.c contains three distinct bugs when parsing space-separated WebSocket URIs from a BACnet/SC Address Resolution ACK message. Two bugs cause out-of-bounds writes past the utf8_urls[10][129] array in the static BSC_ADDRESS_RESOLUTION structure. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, a remote out-of-bounds read exists in the official BACnet client application apps/readpropm in bacnet-stack commit e2bdbf6. When readpropm sends a legitimate ReadPropertyMultiple request to a malicious BACnet/IP peer, the peer can reply with a malformed but structurally valid ReadPropertyMultiple-ACK that drives the client into a global-buffer-overflow read on the global receive buffer Rx_Buf. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. From versions 1.4.0 to before 1.4.6, 1.5.0 to before 1.5.1, and 1.6.0 to before 1.6.1, the BACnet MS/TP receive path decodes COBS frames into an output pointer inside the same fixed input buffer, but passes the full input-buffer size as the decode capacity. A long valid COBS payload can therefore write past the end of the actual remaining buffer. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.6, 1.5.1, 1.6.1, and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5 and 1.5.1, a single unauthenticated BACnet/IP UDP datagram (port 47808) triggers an out-of-bounds read in xy_color_decode() (src/bacnet/lighting.c), reachable pre-authentication through two default-registered service handlers: the UnconfirmedRequest WriteGroup service (0x0A) and Confirmed WriteProperty on a BACnetXYColor-typed property. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. From versions 1.4.2 to before 1.4.5, and 1.5.0 to before 1.5.1, a signed fileStartPosition taken from AtomicReadFile and AtomicWriteFile stream-access requests is not validated tightly enough before it reaches the RAM file backends. Practical impact includes: reliable denial of service via process crash, out-of-bounds read that may expose adjacent memory contents, or out-of-bounds write that may corrupt heap memory and destabilize the process. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5 and 1.5.1. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, there is a library-level memory safety issue that is reachable from an unmodified official sample server (apps/server-basic/main.c) over BACnet/IP resulting in a stack-use-after-return in writable Device string properties. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.6.1, there is a server-side denial-of-service issue affecting the Structured View object implementation. This issue has been patched in versions 1.6.1 and 1.7.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.4, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, a RemoveListElement request targeting Notification-Class.recipient-list can trigger a stack-based out-of-bounds write in the current master branch when the request contains more than NC_MAX_RECIPIENTS valid BACnetDestination elements. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.4, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1, there is a stack-based out-of-bounds write / stack-buffer-overflow in bacnet-stack when the server processes a malicious Atomic-Read-File request in record access mode. The bug is triggered on the real server side. A crafted request can set an excessively large RecordCount, which is later used as the loop bound for writing record data into a stack-allocated BACNET_ATOMIC_READ_FILE_DATA data structure. However, the stack object only has space for one fileData element. When the loop reaches i = 1, the code computes &data->fileData[1], which is already out of bounds, and the resulting invalid pointer is passed down to memmove(), causing a stack-buffer-overflow. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.4 and 1.5.1. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, a Denial of Service (DoS) vulnerability exists in the BACnet stack's ReadPropertyMultiple (RPM) handler. When processing a malformed RPM request packet that lacks the expected closing tags, the function handler_read_property_multiple enters an infinite loop. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0, a malformed but non-empty BACnet WriteProperty request can drive the official server demo into a non-terminating request-processing loop with repeated heap-backed side effects. This results in a remote unauthenticated denial of service via uncontrolled resource consumption and a non-terminating request path. This issue has been patched in versions 1.4.5, 1.5.1, and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the RAMFS-backed FILE implementation accepts AtomicWriteFile(record-access) requests that replace existing records with caller-controlled content. If a client replaces a record with shorter data, the backend can shrink the heap allocation and then continue processing with a trailing-copy length derived from the old layout. During that replace path, the RAMFS backend computes the trailing-copy length from the old file layout, then shrinks the heap allocation, and finally uses the stale length in memmove(). As a result, the source range of that memmove() can extend beyond the end of the reallocated heap buffer, producing a heap out-of-bounds read. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0. |
| BACnet Stack is a BACnet open source protocol stack C library for embedded systems. Prior to version 1.5.1, the BACnet FILE object implementation allows remote WriteProperty(PROP_FILE_SIZE) requests to change the size of a stream-access FILE object without checking whether that FILE is marked Read_Only. When the FILE backend is RAMFS, enlarging the file only performs realloc() and updates the stored size; the newly exposed tail region is not initialized before later reads. As a result, a remote client can enlarge a read-only RAMFS-backed stream-access FILE and then immediately retrieve the newly exposed region with AtomicReadFile(stream-access). Depending on the allocator and build configuration, the returned data may contain sanitizer fill bytes, stale heap contents, or other unintended process memory. Shrinking the file through the same path can also remotely truncate content that was intended to be read-only. This issue has been patched in versions 1.5.1 and 1.6.0. |