In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails
aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a
failed start frees it again:
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox);
...
ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...);
if (ret)
goto free_channel;
...
free_channel:
xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann);
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That
pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a
usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,
aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message
helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.
It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls
aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,
after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context
survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return
value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is
left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every
later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:
- the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed
channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),
- a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() ->
aie2_destroy_context(),
- closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() ->
aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() ->
aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(),
and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()
followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already
freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.
The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -
aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing
it. Do the same here.
The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,
xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling
->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer
never outlives the structure holding it.
Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer
sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and
request_irq() can fail.
accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails
aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a
failed start frees it again:
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox);
...
ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...);
if (ret)
goto free_channel;
...
free_channel:
xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann);
hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That
pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a
usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL,
aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message
helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them.
It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls
aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live,
after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context
survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return
value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is
left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every
later user of it takes the non-NULL branch:
- the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed
channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(),
- a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() ->
aie2_destroy_context(),
- closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() ->
aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() ->
aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(),
and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel()
followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already
freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel.
The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly -
aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing
it. Do the same here.
The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails,
xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling
->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer
never outlives the structure holding it.
Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer
sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and
request_irq() can fail.
Advisories
No advisories yet.
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Thu, 19 Nov 2026 15:00:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails aie2_create_context() allocates a mailbox channel, starts it, and on a failed start frees it again: hwctx->priv->mbox_chann = xdna_mailbox_alloc_channel(ndev->mbox); ... ret = xdna_mailbox_start_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann, ...); if (ret) goto free_channel; ... free_channel: xdna_mailbox_free_channel(hwctx->priv->mbox_chann); hwctx->priv->mbox_chann keeps pointing at the freed channel. That pointer is the driver's own test for whether a hardware context has a usable channel: aie2_destroy_context() returns early on NULL, aie2_sched_job_run() refuses to run a job on NULL, and the message helpers return -ENODEV on NULL. A stale pointer passes all of them. It matters on the restart path. aie2_hwctx_restart() calls aie2_create_context() again on a hardware context that is already live, after aie2_hwctx_stop() has torn its channel down, and the context survives a failure there: aie2_sched_job_timedout() discards the return value entirely, and aie2_hwctx_resume() only propagates it. What is left is a live hardware context holding a freed channel, and every later user of it takes the non-NULL branch: - the next job submitted reaches xdna_mailbox_send_msg() on the freed channel, via the !mbox_chann guard in aie2_sched_job_run(), - a second command timeout reaches aie2_hwctx_stop() -> aie2_destroy_context(), - closing the device reaches aie2_hwctx_fini() -> aie2_release_resource() -> xrs_release_resource() -> aie2_xrs_unload() -> aie2_destroy_context(), and aie2_destroy_context() then calls xdna_mailbox_stop_channel() followed by xdna_mailbox_free_channel() on memory that was already freed: a use-after-free, and a second free of the same channel. The AIE4 management channel already does this correctly - aie4_mailbox_start() clears ndev->aie.mgmt_chann right after freeing it. Do the same here. The create path itself is not affected: when aie2_xrs_load() fails, xrs_allocate_resource() removes the solver node without calling ->unload, and aie2_hwctx_init() frees hwctx->priv, so the stale pointer never outlives the structure holding it. Starting a channel can fail today without this patch: the ring buffer sizes firmware reports are rejected unless both are powers of two, and request_irq() can fail. | |
| Title | accel/amdxdna: clear the mailbox channel pointer when starting it fails | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-11-19T14:43:23.095Z
Reserved: 2026-09-25T10:25:14.418Z
Link: CVE-2026-99485
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-11-19T15:18:03.267
Modified: 2026-11-19T15:18:03.267
Link: CVE-2026-99485
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.