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CVE Vendors Products Updated CVSS v3.1
CVE-2026-68247 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 4.4 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/i915/bios: range check LFP Data Block panel_type2 While the panel_type from LFP Data Block is range checked, panel_type2 is not. Add a few helpers for range checking, and use them to not only check panel_type2, but also improve clarity and correctness in the panel type selection. Discovered using AI-assisted static analysis confirmed by Intel Product Security. v2: - Fix commit message typo (Michał) - Add is_panel_type_pnp() (Ville) (cherry picked from commit c9ebe5d2f25729d6cfbbb1235d640bf67f9275df)
CVE-2026-68190 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 5.9 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix OOB reads in rtw_get_wps_ie() rtw_get_wps_ie() iterates over IE data from network frames without validating that the IE header and payload fit within the remaining buffer before reading them. Specifically: - in_ie[cnt + 1] is read without checking cnt + 1 < in_len - memcmp(&in_ie[cnt + 2], ...) accesses cnt + 2 without bounds check - in_ie[cnt + 1] is used as length without verifying payload fits Add bounds checks at the top of the loop body to break early if fewer than 2 bytes remain for the IE header, or if the declared payload extends past the end of the buffer. Also require at least 4 bytes of payload before comparing the WPS OUI.
CVE-2026-68187 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exec: fix unsigned loop counter wrap in transfer_args_to_stack() The stop value is derived from bprm->p >> PAGE_SHIFT. The index variable is an unsigned long. If bprm->p drops below PAGE_SIZE and stop becomes zero the loop condition index >= stop is always true. After the index == 0 iteration the decrement wraps to ULONG_MAX and bprm->page[ULONG_MAX] reads sizeof(void *) bytes in front of the array. The pointer has wrapped to -1. That garbage pointer is then passed to kmap_local_page() and PAGE_SIZE bytes are copied from wherever that lands into the stack of the process being created. And the loop doesn't terminate either... Getting there only requires bprm->p < PAGE_SIZE. On !MMU bprm_set_stack_limit() and bprm_hit_stack_limit() are empty. So the only constraint on how far bprm->p is pushed down is valid_arg_len(), i.e. that each individual string still fits in what is left. bprm->p starts at PAGE_SIZE * MAX_ARG_PAGES - sizeof(void *) so a single argument or environment string of a little over 31 pages leaves it in the first page: Oops - load access fault [#1] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1 Comm: victim Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4 #1 epc : __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 ra : transfer_args_to_stack+0xaa/0xae s4 : ffffffffffffffff s2 : 0000000000000000 a1 : ffffffdc98000000 a2 : 0000000000001000 status: 0000000a00001880 badaddr: ffffffdc98000000 cause: 0000000000000005 [<801a5324>] __memcpy+0xd4/0xf8 [<800d5f6a>] load_flat_binary+0x43a/0x65e [<800a2de4>] bprm_execve+0x1d4/0x316 [<800a351a>] do_execveat_common+0x12e/0x138 [<800a3d44>] __riscv_sys_execve+0x38/0x4e Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt This is an arcane bug but we should still fix it. Count down from MAX_ARG_PAGES so the loop ends when index reaches stop, stop == 0 included. The iterations performed are unchanged for every other value of stop. Only CONFIG_MMU=n builds are affected, transfer_args_to_stack() is used by binfmt_flat and binfmt_elf_fdpic on nommu only. The loop predates git history. commit 7e7ec6a93434 ("elf_fdpic_transfer_args_to_stack(): make it generic") only moved it from binfmt_elf_fdpic.c into fs/exec.c and narrowed the copy to the used part of the first page. The condition and the decrement are unchanged from 2.6.12-rc2.
CVE-2026-68184 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 4.7 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: cdrom: fix stack out-of-bounds read in CDROMVOLCTRL mmc_ioctl_cdrom_volume() first reads the audio control mode page into a 32-byte stack buffer with cgc->buflen set to 24. If the device reports a block descriptor, the function increases cgc->buflen to include that descriptor and reads the page again. For CDROMVOLCTRL, the function then builds a MODE SELECT parameter list by moving cgc->buffer forward by offset - 8 bytes. This drops the block descriptor from the outgoing payload and leaves a new 8-byte mode parameter header in front of the audio control page. However, cgc->buflen is left unchanged. With a standard 8-byte block descriptor, cgc->buffer points at buffer + 8 but cgc->buflen remains 32. cdrom_mode_select() therefore asks the low level packet path to write 32 bytes from that adjusted pointer, reading 8 bytes past the end of the 32-byte stack buffer. This is not hit by CDROMVOLREAD, and CDROMVOLCTRL only triggers it on drives that return a non-zero block descriptor length, which helps explain why it has gone unnoticed. The overread is also sent to the device as extra MODE SELECT payload, so it may not produce an obvious local failure. Reduce cgc->buflen by the same amount as the buffer pointer adjustment so the MODE SELECT transfer covers only the intended parameter list.
CVE-2026-64446 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: staging: rtl8723bs: fix heap buffer overflow in rtw_cfg80211_set_wpa_ie() supplicant_ie is a 256-byte array in struct security_priv. The WPA and WPA2 IE copy paths use: memcpy(padapter->securitypriv.supplicant_ie, &pwpa[0], wpa_ielen + 2); where wpa_ielen is the raw IE length field (u8, 0-255). When a local user supplies a connect request via nl80211 with a crafted WPA IE of length 255, wpa_ielen + 2 equals 257, overflowing the 256-byte buffer by one byte into the adjacent last_mic_err_time field. rtw_parse_wpa_ie() does not prevent this: its length consistency check compares *(wpa_ie+1) against (u8)(wpa_ie_len-2), which is (u8)(255) == 255 when wpa_ie_len = 257, so the check passes silently. Add explicit bounds checks for both the WPA and WPA2 paths before the memcpy, rejecting any IE whose total size (wpa_ielen + 2) exceeds the supplicant_ie buffer.
CVE-2026-64425 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring/io-wq: re-check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT for each linked work item commit 10dc95939817 ("io_uring/io-wq: check IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT inside work run loop") fixed the obvious case where io_worker_handle_work() took one exit-bit snapshot before draining pending work, but the fix stops one level too early. io_worker_handle_work() now re-checks IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT in its outer work run loop, yet it still snapshots that bit once before processing a whole dependent linked-work chain. If io_wq_exit_start() sets IO_WQ_BIT_EXIT after the first linked item has started, the remaining linked items can still reuse stale do_kill = false, skip IO_WQ_WORK_CANCEL, and continue running after exit has begun. Move the check further inside, so it covers linked items too. Note: this is a syzbot special as it loves setting up tons of slow linked work on weird devices like msr that take forever to read, and immediately close the ring. Exit then takes a long time.
CVE-2026-64357 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: fix exchmaps reservation limit check xfs_exchmaps_estimate_overhead() adds the bmbt and rmapbt overhead to a local resblks variable, but the final UINT_MAX check still tests req->resblks. That is the reservation value from before the overhead was added. The computed value is stored back in req->resblks and later passed to xfs_trans_alloc(), whose block reservation argument is unsigned int. Check the computed reservation so the existing limit applies to the value that will be used.
CVE-2026-64351 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: usb: kalmia: bound RX frame length in kalmia_rx_fixup() kalmia_rx_fixup() computes usb_packet_length = skb->len - (2 * KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH) as a u16, guarded only by a pre-loop check that skb->len is at least KALMIA_HEADER_LENGTH, which is 6. A device can deliver a short bulk-IN frame with skb->len in the 6 to 11 range, or leave a short trailing remainder on a later loop iteration. Either case underflows usb_packet_length to about 65530. That bypasses the usb_packet_length < ether_packet_length truncation path. The device-supplied ether_packet_length, a le16 up to 65535 read from header_start[2], then drives a memcmp() and the following skb_trim() and skb_pull() past the end of the rx buffer. The rx buffer is hard_mtu * 10, which is 14000 bytes. That is an out of bounds read. Require both the start and end framing headers to be present before subtracting them, on every loop iteration.
CVE-2026-64347 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: gadget: composite: fix dead empty check in the USB_DT_OTG handler The OTG branch of composite_setup() falls back to the first configuration when none is selected: if (cdev->config) config = cdev->config; else config = list_first_entry(&cdev->configs, struct usb_configuration, list); if (!config) goto done; ... memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value); list_first_entry() never returns NULL. On an empty list it returns container_of() of the list head. So the "if (!config)" check is dead. When cdev->configs is empty, config points at the head inside struct usb_composite_dev. config->descriptors[0] reads whatever sits at that offset. The memcpy copies up to w_length bytes of it into the response buffer. cdev->configs can be empty in two cases. One is a teardown race on gadget unbind with a control transfer in flight. The other is a driver that sets is_otg before it adds a config. A reproducer that holds cdev->configs empty triggers a KASAN fault in this branch. Use list_first_entry_or_null() so the existing check does its job.
CVE-2026-64330 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: usb: typec: tcpm: Validate SVID index in svdm_consume_modes() In svdm_consume_modes(), the SVID value is read from pmdata->svids using pmdata->svid_index as an array index without bounds validation: paltmode->svid = pmdata->svids[pmdata->svid_index]; If pmdata->svid_index is driven beyond SVID_DISCOVERY_MAX (16), it results in an out-of-bounds read of the pmdata->svids array. Because pd_mode_data is embedded inside struct tcpm_port, indexing past svids reads into adjacent fields. In particular: - At index 16, it reads the altmodes count. - At index 18 and beyond, it reads into altmode_desc[], which contains partner-supplied SVDM Discovery Modes VDOs. By injecting a chosen SVID into altmode_desc[0].vdo and driving svid_index to 20, the partner can force paltmode->svid to be loaded with an arbitrary, partner- chosen SVID, which is then registered via typec_partner_register_altmode(). Fix this by validating that pmdata->svid_index is non-negative and strictly less than pmdata->nsvids before accessing the pmdata->svids array inside svdm_consume_modes().
CVE-2026-64283 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.0 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: guest_memfd: Treat memslot binding offset+size as unsigned values When binding a memslot to a guest_memfd file, treat the offset and size as unsigned values to fix a bug where the sum of the two can result in a false negative when checking for overflow against the size of the file. Passing unsigned values also avoids relying on somewhat obscure checks in other flows for safety, and tracks the offset and size as they are intended to be tracked, as unsigned values. On 64-bit kernels, the number of pages a memslot contains and thus the size (and offset) of its guest_memfd binding are unsigned 64-bit values. Taking the offset+size as an loff_t instead of a uoff_t inadvertently converts the unsigned value to a signed value if the offset and/or size is massive. Locally storing the offset and size as signed values is benign in and of itself (though even that is *extremely* difficult to discern), but operating on their sum is not. For the offset, KVM explicitly checks against a negative value, which might seem like a bug as KVM could incorrectly reject a legitimate binding, but that's not actually the case as KVM_CREATE_GUEST_MEMFD takes a signed value for its size, i.e. a would-be-negative offset is also greater than the maximum possible size of any guest_memfd file. Regarding the size, while KVM lacks an explicit check for a negative value, i.e. seemingly has a flawed overflow check, KVM restricts the number of pages in a single memslot to the largest positive signed 32-bit value: if (id < KVM_USER_MEM_SLOTS && (mem->memory_size >> PAGE_SHIFT) > KVM_MEM_MAX_NR_PAGES) return -EINVAL; and so that maximum "size" will ever be is 0x7fffffff000. The sum of the two is, however, problematic. While the size is restricted by KVM's memslot logic, the offset is not, i.e. the offset is completely unchecked until the "offset + size > i_size_read(inode)" check. If the offset is the (nearly) largest possible _positive_ value, then adding size to the offset can result in a signed, negative 64-bit value. When compared against the size of the file (guaranteed to be positive), the negative sum is always smaller, and KVM incorrectly allows the absurd offset. Opportunistically add missing includes in kvm_mm.h (instead of relying on its parents).
CVE-2026-64272 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: mms114 - fix touch indexing for MMS134S and MMS136 The MMS134S and MMS136 touch controllers have an event size of 6 bytes rather than 8 bytes. When __mms114_read_reg() reads the touch data packet from the device into the touch buffer, the events are packed tightly at 6-byte intervals. However, the driver iterates through the events using standard C array indexing (touch[index]), where each element is sizeof(struct mms114_touch) (8 bytes) apart. As a result, any touch events beyond the first one are read from incorrect offsets and parsed improperly. Fix this by explicitly calculating the byte offset for each touch event based on the device's specific event size.
CVE-2026-64271 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: touchwin - reset the packet index on every complete packet tw_interrupt() accumulates each non-zero serial byte into a fixed three-byte buffer with a running index that is only reset once a full packet has been received *and* the device's two Y bytes agree: tw->data[tw->idx++] = data; if (tw->idx == TW_LENGTH && tw->data[1] == tw->data[2]) { ... tw->idx = 0; } The reset is gated on tw->data[1] == tw->data[2], a value the device controls. A malicious, malfunctioning or counterfeit Touchwindow peripheral can stream non-zero bytes whose 2nd and 3rd bytes differ: the index reaches TW_LENGTH without the equality holding, is never reset, and keeps growing, so tw->data[tw->idx++] walks off the end of the three-byte array and the rest of the heap-allocated struct tw, one attacker-chosen byte at a time -- an unbounded, device-driven heap out-of-bounds write. Reset the index on every completed packet and report an event only when the two Y bytes match, like the other serio touchscreen drivers do.
CVE-2026-64256 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: xfs: don't wrap around quota ids in dqiterate LOLLM noticed that q_id is an unsigned 32-bit variable. If it happens to be set to XFS_DQ_ID_MAX due to a filesystem that actually has a dquot for ID_MAX, then this addition will truncate to zero and the iteration starts over. Fix this by casting to u64.
CVE-2026-64237 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.1 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Input: elan_i2c - validate firmware size before use Ensure that the firmware file is large enough to contain the expected number of pages and the signature (which resides at the end of the firmware blob) before accessing them to prevent potential out-of-bounds reads.
CVE-2026-64225 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: octeontx2-af: CGX: add bounds check to cgx_speed_mbps index cgx_speed_mbps has 13 elements but RESP_LINKSTAT_SPEED can yield values 0-15. If it returns a value >= 13, this causes an out-of-bounds array access. Add a bounds check and default to speed 0 if the index is out of range.
CVE-2026-64186 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.1 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: iommu/amd: Remove latent out-of-bounds access in IOMMU debugfs In iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write(), the variables dbg_mmio_offset and dbg_cap_offset are declared as int. However, they are populated using kstrtou32_from_user(). If a user provides a sufficiently large value, it can become a negative integer. Prior to this patch, the AMD IOMMU debugfs implementation was already protected by different mechanisms. 1. #define OFS_IN_SZ 8 ensures the user string <= 8 bytes, so e.g. 0xffffffff isn't a valid input. if (cnt > OFS_IN_SZ) return -EINVAL; 2. Implicit type promotion in iommu_mmio_write(), dbg_mmio_offset is int and iommu->mmio_phys_end is u64 if (dbg_mmio_offset > iommu->mmio_phys_end - sizeof(u64)) return -EINVAL; 3. The show handlers would currently catch the negative number and refuse to perform the read. Replace kstrtou32_from_user() with kstrtos32_from_user() to parse the input, and check for negative values to explicitly prevent out-of-bounds memory accesses directly in iommu_mmio_write() and iommu_capability_write().
CVE-2026-64173 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 5.5 Medium
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Do not call map->ops->elt_free() if elt_alloc() fails In paths where tracing_map_elt_alloc() failed to allocate objects, the map->ops->elt_alloc() call was never successful. In this case, map->ops->elt_free() should not be called.
CVE-2026-64121 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.1 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: ifb: report ethtool stats over num_tx_queues ifb_dev_init() allocates dp->tx_private to dev->num_tx_queues entries via kzalloc_objs(*txp, dev->num_tx_queues). Both IFB per-queue RX and TX stats live in those entries: ifb_xmit() updates txp->rx_stats using the skb queue mapping, ifb_ri_tasklet() updates txp->tx_stats, and ifb_stats64() aggregates both over dev->num_tx_queues. The ethtool stats callbacks instead size and walk the per-queue stats with dev->real_num_rx_queues and dev->real_num_tx_queues. With an asymmetric device where the RX queue count exceeds the TX queue count, for example: ip link add name ifb10 numtxqueues 1 numrxqueues 8 type ifb ethtool -S ifb10 ifb_get_ethtool_stats() indexes past the tx_private allocation and copies adjacent slab data through ETHTOOL_GSTATS. Use dev->num_tx_queues consistently for the stats strings, the stats count, and the stats data walks. This reports one RX stats group and one TX stats group for each backing ifb_q_private entry, which is the queue set IFB can actually populate. Reproduced under UML+KASAN at v7.1-rc2: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ifb_fill_stats_data+0x3c/0xae Read of size 8 at addr 0000000062dbd228 by task ethtool/36 ifb_fill_stats_data+0x3c/0xae ifb_get_ethtool_stats+0xc0/0x129 __dev_ethtool+0x1ca5/0x363c dev_ethtool+0x123/0x1b3 dev_ioctl+0x56c/0x744 sock_do_ioctl+0x15f/0x1b2 sock_ioctl+0x4d5/0x50a sys_ioctl+0xd8b/0xde9 With the patch applied, the same UML+KASAN repro is silent and ethtool -S ifb10 reports only the stats backed by the single allocated tx_private entry.
CVE-2026-64054 1 Linux 1 Linux Kernel 2026-11-06 7.8 High
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: shaper: reject duplicate leaves in GROUP request net_shaper_nl_group_doit() does not deduplicate NET_SHAPER_A_LEAVES entries. When userspace supplies the same leaf handle twice, the same old-parent pointer lands twice in old_nodes[]. The cleanup loop double frees the parent. Of course the same parent may still be in old_nodes[] twice if we are moving multiple of its leaves. Note that this patch also implicitly fixes the fact that the i >= leaves_count path forgets to set ret.